Based on implemented policies, Germany’s GHG emissions are expected to decrease to 735 MtCO₂e/year by 2030 (excl. forestry). This emission pathway is not compatible with the Paris Agreement. Germany committed to the joint NDC of the European Union (EU). The EU’s NDC is not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s temperature limit but would lead to a warming of between 2°C and 3°C.

Germany’s sectoral policies are still falling short of being consistent with the Paris Agreement, especially with respect to coal phase-out and transport, but the country’s ambitious policy on renewable energy is a promising sign.

The government admitted in 2017 that Germany would miss its 2020 GHG emission target by 8%. Germany has blocked negotiations on more ambitious CO₂ limits at EU level for light-duty vehicles for 2025 and 2030. The government launched a Commission to develop by the end of 2018 a plan for the country’s coal phase-out.
GERMANY’S EXPOSURE TO CLIMATE IMPACTS

This indicator shows the extent to which human society and its supporting sectors are affected by the future changing climate conditions based on an approximately 2°C scenario. This sectoral exposure will be even higher given that the efforts depicted in current NDCs will lead to an approximately 3°C scenario.

FOOD
Projected climate impacts on cereal yields

WATER
Projected climate impacts on annual run-off

HEALTH
Projected climate impacts on a spread of malnutrition and diarrhoeal diseases

ECOSYSTEM SERVICE
Projected climate impacts on biomes occupying the countries

HUMAN HABITAT
Projected climate impacts on frequency of high temperature periods

INFRASTRUCTURE
Projected climate impacts on hydropower generation capacity

Projected increase of food demand due to population growth

Projected climate impacts on annual groundwater recharge

Projected climate impacts on spread of vector-borne diseases

Projected climate impacts on marine biodiversity

Projected climate impacts on frequency and severity of floods

Proportion of coastline impacted by sea level rise

Source: World Bank 2017
Data from 2017 | Source: UNDP 2018

Own composition based on ND-GAIN 2017 (based on data for 2016)
Germany’s emissions have decreased by 28% between 1990 and 2015, and this trend is expected to continue towards 2030. Emissions from the energy sector are by far the largest contributor.

The largest driver for overall GHG emissions are CO₂ emissions from energy, which have increased in Germany by 2% (2012–2017), mainly due to transport and industries. Overall, power generation still accounts for the largest share.
ENERGY MIX

Total primary energy supply (PJ)

- 23% Gas
- 33% Renewables (incl. hydro and excl. residential biomass)
- 6% Nuclear
- 24% Oil
- 3% Other

Source: Enerdata 2018

SHARE OF FOSSIL FUELS AND ‘ZERO-CARBON’ FUELS IN ENERGY SUPPLY

- Zero-carbon fuels include nuclear, hydropower and new renewables. They account for 18% of Germany’s energy mix, which is slightly above the G20 average of 14%.

PERFORMANCE RATING OF SHARE OF FOSSIL FUELS

PERFORMANCE RATING OF SHARE OF ZERO-CARBON TECHNOLOGY

Source: own evaluation

Zero-carbon fuels include nuclear, hydropower and new renewables. They account for 18% of Germany’s energy mix, which is slightly above the G20 average of 14%.
NEW RENEWABLES

“New renewables” excludes unsustainable renewable sources such as large hydropower. New renewables account for 11% of Germany’s energy supply – this is above the G20 average of 5%. Supply from new renewables increased by 37% between 2012 and 2017, driven by growth in wind, solar and biomass energy.

ENERGY USE PER CAPITA

Energy use per capita in Germany is well above the G20 average, and is only slowly decreasing (-2%, 2012–2017).
**ENERGY INTENSITY OF THE ECONOMY**

Total primary energy supply (TPES) per unit of GDP (PPP) (TJ/million US$ 2015)

This indicator quantifies how much energy is used for each unit of GDP. Germany’s energy intensity is one of the lowest in the G20 but is decreasing at a lower speed (-6%, 2012–2017) than the G20 (-11%).

**CARBON INTENSITY OF THE ENERGY SECTOR**

Tonnes of CO₂ per unit of total primary energy supply (tCO₂/TJ)

The carbon intensity of Germany’s energy sector is close to the G20 average and has hardly changed over the past few years, reflecting the continuously high share of fossil fuels.
## Sector-Specific Indicators

### Power Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>G20</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity demand per capita (kWh/capita)</td>
<td>6,370</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emissions intensity of the power sector (gCO₂/kWh)</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of renewables in power generation (incl. large hydro)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>+42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population with access to electricity</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population with biomass dependency</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from 2017 | Source: Enerdata 2018  
Data from 2016 | Source: Enerdata 2018  
Data from 2016 | Source: Enerdata 2018  
Data from 2016 | Source: World Bank 2018  
Data from 2014 | Source: IEA 2016

### Transport Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Freight transport (modal split in % of tonne·km)</th>
<th>Passenger transport (modal split in % of passenger-km)</th>
<th>Motorisation rate (Vehicles per 1000 inhabitants)</th>
<th>Transport emissions per capita (tCO₂/capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20 average</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend:</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from 2016 | Source: Agora Verkehrswende 2018  
Data from 2017 | Source: Agora Verkehrswende 2018  
Data from 2016 | Source: Agora Verkehrswende 2018  
Data from 2017 | Source: Agora Verkehrswende 2018  
Data from 2016 | Source: IEA 2018

### Industry Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Industry emissions intensity (tCO₂e/thousand US$2015 sectoral GDP (PPP))</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20 average</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from 2015 | Source: PRIMAP 2018

### Building Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Building emissions per capita (tCO₂/capita)</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20 average</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>+12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend:</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from 2015 | Source: PRIMAP 2018

### Agriculture Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Agriculture emissions intensity (tCO₂e/thousand US$2015 sectoral GDP (PPP))</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20 average</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>+12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from 2015 | Source: PRIMAP 2018

### Forest Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Forest area compared to 1990 level (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G20 average</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from 2015 | Source: PRIMAP-2018

The trend number shows developments over the past five years, where data is available.

Legend for trend: negative, positive
Germany has a national target of reducing GHG emissions in 2030 by 55% below 1990 levels. As an EU member state, Germany did not submit its own NDC under the Paris Agreement, committing instead to the EU’s NDC. The CAT rates the EU’s NDC “insufficient” as it is not ambitious enough to limit warming to below 2°C, let alone to 1.5°C. Under current policies, the EU is not on track to meet its 2030 target.

### Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)

The table presents the NDC of the European Union that includes contributions from all member states.

#### Mitigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Overall targets</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least 40% domestic GHG emissions reduction compared to 1990 by 2030</td>
<td>100% of emissions covered (all sectors and gases)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Actions          | Not mentioned                                                                  |

#### Adaptation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Not mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Finance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment needs</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Not mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International market mechanisms</td>
<td>No contribution from international credits for the achievement of the target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation based on UNFCCC 2018

---

**CLIMATE POLICY**

**COMPATIBILITY OF CLIMATE TARGETS WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT**

The table presents the NDC of the European Union that includes contributions from all member states.

**Source:** own compilation based on UNFCCC 2018

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**GERMANY**

**Country Facts 2018**

**BROWN TO GREEN: THE G20 TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY | 2018**
POLICY EVALUATION

The ratings evaluate a selection of policies that are essential pre-conditions for the longer-term transformation required to meet the 1.5°C limit. They do not represent a complete picture of what is necessary.

Germany's 2050 strategy envisages GHG emission reductions of 80% to 95% from 1990 levels by 2050, providing sectoral targets and interim steps to reach this goal. The government has established institutions to monitor and regularly update the plan and intends to adopt a set of implementation measures by the end of 2018, and pass a Climate Protection Act in 2019.

POWER

Germany aims to produce 80% of electricity from renewable sources by 2050. The government switched from a feed-in tariff system to an auctioning scheme in 2017.

TRANSPORT

The German government has not adopted a target to phase out fossil fuel LDVs yet, although many regional governments have been demanding this step. The government supports the purchase of electric vehicles and invests in charging infrastructure to get 1 million EVs on the road by 2022 – but at the same time it still subsidises the use of fossil fuels, particularly diesel, through tax exemptions.

BUILDINGS

Germany wants to make all new buildings zero energy by 2020 but announced recently it will not upgrade its energy standards in the next few years. It also aims to make the entire building stock virtually climate-neutral by 2050 (80% energy reduction) but renovation rates are still insufficient.

INDUSTRY

Germany forms part of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme and applies a large range of regulatory and funding instruments to reduce energy use in industry, but has no target for new installations in emissions-intensive sectors to be low-carbon.

FORESTS

Germany aims to increase its forest area over the next few decades.
CCPI EXPERTS’ POLICY EVALUATION\(^{18}\)

Germany’s experts give a low rating for its national climate policy performance. They see room for improvement regarding the 2030 renewables target. They also criticise the previous (and current) government for insufficient action on turning the promises it made in Paris into national law. Germany has taken on an increasingly vocal role within international climate negotiations and during the G20 summit, for which the country receives a high rating for its international climate policy performance.

![CCPI Evaluation of Climate Policy (2018)](image)

**JUST TRANSITION\(^ {19}\)**

Since 2016, Germany has had a long-term climate strategy with explicit sectoral targets, which will need far-reaching structural changes across various economic sectors to be achieved.

German labour unions have campaigned for just transition implementation for the affected sectors and workers. For example, around 20,000 workers would be affected if the government decides to phase out lignite coal use, to meet the Paris Agreement targets.

The government pledged €1.5 billion over 2017–2021 to ease structural changes, acknowledging more funding will be needed beyond 2021. It set up a commission on “Growth, structural change and employment” that will address coal phase-out.

There is ongoing debate in Germany on how to define “just transition”. NGOs and citizens’ initiatives emphasise that affected parties, including those forced to relocate due to lignite mining, or affected by climate change worldwide, must be included in just transition discourse.
FINANCING THE TRANSITION

**GERMANY**

**FINANCIAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS**

Through policy and regulation governments can overcome challenges to mobilising green finance, including: real and perceived risks, insufficient returns on investment, capacity and information gaps.

**APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD)**

This indicator establishes the degree of government engagement with the recommendations of the G20 Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No formal engagement with TCFD</th>
<th>Political and regulatory engagement</th>
<th>Formal engagement with private sector</th>
<th>Publication of guidance and action plans</th>
<th>Encoding into law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Germany’s central bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, has endorsed the TCFD recommendations and is a founding member of the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). More broadly, Germany made sustainable finance a priority during their G20 presidency in 2017.

**FISCAL POLICY LEVERS**

Fiscal policy levers raise public revenues and direct public resources. Critically, they can shift investment decisions and consumer behaviour towards low-carbon, climate-resilient activities by reflecting externalities in prices.

**FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES**

In 2016, Germany provided US$5.4bn in fossil fuel subsidies. From 2007 to 2016, subsidies were lower (US$0.001) than the G20 average (US$0.003) per unit of GDP, fluctuating between US$4.8bn and US$5.8bn. Subsidies were provided through direct budget support and tax exemptions, and primarily targeted consumption and production (50% and 41%, respectively). The largest subsidy is the combined aid to hard coal mining in North Rhine Westphalia (US$1.5bn in 2016).

**CARBON REVENUES**

Germany has no national carbon tax or emissions trading scheme, but announced it is exploring options for joint carbon pricing with France. Under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, it generated US$1.3bn in 2017 in Germany alone. From 2012 to 2017, Germany’s carbon revenues were lower (US$0.0003) than the G20 average (US$0.0005) per unit of GDP.

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**Source:** OECD/IEA 2018

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**Source:** CISL 2018
FINANCING THE TRANSITION

PUBLIC FINANCE

Governments steer investments through their public finance institutions including via development banks, both at home and overseas, and green investment banks. Developed G20 countries also have an obligation to provide finance to developing countries and public sources are a key aspect of these obligations under the UNFCCC.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE IN THE POWER SECTOR

From 2013 to 2015, Germany’s public finance institutions spent an annual average of US$1.3bn brown, US$2.4bn green and US$0.3bn grey financing in the power sector, domestically and internationally. The largest transactions were Euler Hermes’ loan guarantee (US$1.3bn) for the Beni Suef natural gas power plant in Egypt, and the loan (US$964m) to the Ptolemais V coal power plant in Greece.

Proportion of total public finance to power

2013-2015 annual average of power finance (US$ billions)

Source: Oil Change International 2017

PROVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SUPPORT

Germany provided the third largest amount of bilateral climate finance and the fourth largest amount to multilateral climate funds (12.5% of the G20 total). Unlike other countries, Germany’s reports include funds “mobilised through KFW”, Germany’s development bank, worth US$5.47bn annually in 2015/2016. This amount is acknowledged but excluded, making Germany’s contribution comparable to other G20 countries. While Germany may channel international public finance towards climate change via multilateral development banks, this has not been included in this report.

OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE CLIMATE FINANCE UNDER UNFCCC

CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL CLIMATE FUNDS

Annual average contribution (mn US$, 2015-2016)

Theme of support

Adaptation Mitigation Cross-cutting

G20

28% 58% 14%

Note: See Technical Note for multilateral climate funds included and method to attribute amounts to countries

Source: Climate Funds Update 2017

BILATERAL CLIMATE FINANCE CONTRIBUTIONS

Annual average contribution (mn US$, 2015-2016)

Theme of support

Mitigation Adaptation Cross-cutting Other

Germany

62% 11% 7% 20%

Source: Country reporting to UNFCCC

Note: See Technical Note for multilateral climate funds included and method to attribute amounts to countries

1) The 2030 projections of the future development of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under current policies are based on the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) estimates.

2) The CAT is an independent scientific analysis that tracks progress towards the globally agreed aim of holding warming to well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. The CAT “Effort Sharing” assessment methodology applies state-of-the-art scientific literature on how to compare the fairness of government efforts and (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution (I) NDC proposals against the level and timing of emission reductions consistent with the Paris Agreement. The assessment of the temperature implications of a country’s NDC is based on the assumption that all other governments would follow a similar level of ambition.

3) This assessment is based on the policy evaluation on page 9 of this Country Profile.

4) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is calculated by dividing GDP with mid-year population figures. GDP is the value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given year. Here GDP figures at purchasing power parity (PPP) are used. Data for 2017.

5) The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development. A country scores higher when the lifespan is higher, the education level is higher, and GDP per capita is higher.

6) The ND-GAIN index summarises a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. This report looks only at the exposure indicators as part of the vulnerability component of the ND-GAIN index for six sectors. It displays the exposure scores provided by the ND-GAIN on a scale from low (score: 0) to high (score: 1).

7) The indicator covers all Kyoto gases showing historic emissions in each of the IPCC source categories (energy, industrial processes, agriculture, etc.). Emissions projections (excl. forestry) under a current policy scenario until 2030 are taken from the Climate Action Tracker and scaled to the historical emissions from PRIMAP (see Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note).

8) The ratings on GHG emissions are taken from the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) 2018. The rating of “current level compared to a well below 2°C pathway” is based on a global scenario of GHG neutrality in the second half of the century and a common but differentiated convergence approach.

9) CO₂ emissions cover only the emissions from fossil fuels combustion (coal, oil and gas) by sector. They are calculated according to the UNFCCC methodology (in line with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories).

10) Total primary energy supply data displayed in this Country Profile does not include non-energy use values. Solid fuel biomass in residential use has negative environmental and social impacts and is shown in the category “other”.

11) Zero-carbon fuels include nuclear, hydropower and new renewables (non-residential biomass, geothermal, wind, solar).

12) Climate Transparency ratings assess the relative performance across the G20. A high scoring reflects a good effort from a climate protection perspective but is not necessarily 1.5°C compatible.

13) New renewables include non-residential biomass, geothermal, wind and solar energy. Hydropower and solid fuel biomass in residential use are excluded due to their negative environmental and social impacts.

14) Total primary energy supply (TPES) per capita displays the historical, current and projected energy supply in relation to a country’s population. Alongside the intensity indicators (TPES/GDP and CO₂/TPES), TPES per capita gives an indication on the energy efficiency of a country’s economy. In line with a well-below 2°C limit, TPES per capita should not grow above current global average levels. This means that developing countries are still allowed to expand their energy use to the current global average, while developed countries have to simultaneously reduce it to that same number.

15) TPES per GDP describes the energy intensity of a country’s economy. This indicator illustrates the efficiency of energy usage by calculating the energy needed to produce one unit of GDP. Here GDP figures at PPP are used. A decrease in this indicator can mean an increase in efficiency but also reflects structural economic changes.

16) The carbon intensity of a country’s energy sector describes the CO₂ emissions per unit of total primary energy supply and gives an indication of the share of fossil fuels in the energy supply.
17) The selection of policies rated and the assessment of 1.5°C compatibility are informed by the Paris Agreement and the Climate Action Tracker (2018). "The ten most important short-term steps to limit warming to 1.5°C." The table below displays the criteria used to assess a country’s policy performance. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for the sources used for this assessment.

18) The CCPI evaluates a country’s performance in national climate policy, as well as international climate diplomacy through feedback from national experts from non-governmental organisations to a standardised questionnaire.

19) See the Brown to Green 2018 Technical Note for the sources used for this assessment.

20) The University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) in early 2018 reviewed the progress made by the national regulatory agencies of G20 members in making the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations relevant to their national contexts. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for more information on the assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On endnote 17</th>
<th>Criteria description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GHG emissions target for 2050 or beyond</strong></td>
<td>No emissions reduction target for 2050 or beyond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term low emissions development strategy</strong></td>
<td>No long-term low emissions strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Renewable energy in power sector** | Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), average 0-25 | Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), average 26-60 | Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), average 61-100 | Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), 61-100 plus 100% renewables in the power sector by 2050 in place |

| **Coal phase-out** | No consideration or policy in place for phasing out coal | Significant action to reduce coal use implemented or coal phase-out under consideration | Coal phase-out decided and under implementation | Coal phase-out date compatible with 1.5°C |

| **Phase-out of fossil fuel light duty vehicles (LDVs)** | No policy or emissions performance standards for LDVs in place | Energy/emissions performance standards or support for efficient LDVs | National target to phase out fossil fuel LDVs in place | Ban on new fossil-based LDVs by 2025/30 |

| **Near zero-energy new buildings** | No policy or low emissions building codes and standards in place | Building codes, standards or fiscal/financial incentives for low emissions options in place | National strategy for near zero-energy buildings (at least for all new buildings) | National strategy for near zero-energy buildings by 2020/25 (at least for all new buildings) |

| **Low-carbon new industry installations** | No policy or support for energy efficiency in industrial production in place | Support for energy efficiency in industrial production (covering at least two of the country’s sub-sectors (e.g. cement and steel production)) | Target for new installations in emissions-intensive sectors to be low-carbon | Target for new installations in emissions-intensive sectors to be low-carbon after 2020, maximising efficiency |

| **Net zero deforestation** | No policy or incentive to reduce deforestation in place | Incentives to reduce deforestation or support schemes for afforestation/reforestation in place | National target for reaching zero deforestation | National target for reaching zero deforestation by 2020s or for increasing forest coverage |

21) This data includes bilateral public finance institutions such as national development banks and other development finance institutions, overseas aid agencies, export credit agencies, as well as key multilateral development banks. The analysis omits most finance delivered through financial intermediaries and significant volumes of multilateral development bank (MDB) development policy finance (due to a lack of clarity on power finance volumes). Given a lack of transparency, other important multilateral institutions in which G20 governments participate are not covered. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for further details.

22) Finance delivered through multilateral climate funds comes from Climate Funds Update, a joint ODI/Heinrich Boell Foundation database that tracks spending through major multilateral climate funds. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for multilateral climate funds included and method to attribute approved amounts to countries.

23) Bilateral finance commitments are sourced from Biennial Party reporting to the UNFCCC. Financial instrument reporting is sourced from the OECD-DAC; refer to the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for more detail. Figures represent commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds to projects or programmes, as opposed to actual disbursements.
CLIMATE TRANSPARENCY

Partners:

Funders:

Data Partners:

http://www.climate-transparency.org/g20-climate-performance/g20report2018

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