Mexico’s conditional 2020 NDC target would increase emissions to 45% above 1990 levels, or to approximately 638 MtCO\textsubscript{2e}, by 2030. To keep below the 1.5°C temperature limit, Mexico’s 2030 emissions would need to be around 383 MtCO\textsubscript{2e} (or 13% above 1990 levels), leaving an ambition gap of 255 MtCO\textsubscript{2e}. All figures exclude land use emissions.

**PER CAPITA GREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) EMISSIONS BELOW G20 AVERAGE**

GHG emissions (incl. land use) per capita (tCO\textsubscript{2e}/capita\textsuperscript{2}) in 2018

Mexico’s per capita emissions are 0.61 times the G20 average. Total per capita emissions have increased by 3.5% between 2013 and 2018.

**KEY OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENHANCING CLIMATE AMBITION**

- Develop and implement the NDC roadmap to define and make transparent the range of actions that are needed to meet with the unconditional mitigation goal and adaptation commitments.
- Disincentivise state-owned fossil fuel-fired power plants to put Mexico on a decarbonisation path.
- Increase the stringency of regulations for fuel efficiency and emissions limits for light- and heavy-duty vehicles and, implement the National Electromobility Strategy together with sustainable urban mobility programmes in cities.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

- Federal states and cities have significantly increased their commitments to enhance climate action at the subnational level. More ambitious policies and instruments to bring about decarbonisation are in place in some cities.
- Current energy policies halt private renewable energy investment. No significant renewable power capacity was added in 2020, and there are also no plans to increase capacity until 2027.
- The Sembrando Vida programme has caused a 73,000ha loss of tree cover. Annually, this programme gets almost 10 times the budget of CONAFOR, the National Forestry Commission responsible for conservation and administration of forests.

---

1. Presidencia de la República, 2020; Lo, 2021; Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2021; Ritchie, 2021; Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión de México, 2015; Averchenkova and Guzman Luna, 2018; CFE 2020; Tornel, 2021; UNEP 2021

2. Climate Action Tracker, 2021; Gütschow et al., 2021; United Nations, 2019

---

**CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE AND RECOVERY**

As of July 2021, Mexico ranked fourth in Latin America for the number of cumulative COVID-19 cases since the beginning of the pandemic. Despite its initial economic slump, the Mexican economy has begun to recover in the summer of 2021, thanks mainly to the return of exports to the United States. Although Mexico has reportedly spent 1% of its GDP on pandemic recovery measures, virtually none of that spending has gone to green measures, while spending on fossil fuel infrastructure has increased.

Presidencia de la República, 2020; Lo, 2021; Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2021; Ritchie, 2021
We unpack Mexico’s progress and highlight key opportunities to enhance climate action across:

- in the power sector
- in the transport sector
- in the building sector
- in the industrial sector
- in land use
- in agriculture

Energy used:
- in the power sector
- in the transport sector
- in the building sector
- in the industrial sector

Non-energy uses:
- in land use
- in agriculture

Decarbonisation Ratings assess a country’s performance compared to other G20 countries. A high score reflects a relatively good effort from a climate protection perspective but is not necessarily 1.5°C compatible.

Policy Ratings evaluate a selection of policies that are essential pre-conditions for the longer-term transformation required to meet the 1.5°C limit.

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

#### Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI reflects life expectancy, level of education, and per capita income. Mexico ranks high.

Data for 2019: UNDP, 2020

#### Population and urbanisation projections

Mexico’s population is projected to increase by 23% by 2050, and become slightly more urbanised. An increase in Mexico’s urban population is exacerbating existing problems of traffic congestion, air pollution and water pollution already happening in Mexico’s main cities, such as Mexico City. This will contribute to both worsening public health and increased emissions from transport and energy use.

United Nations, 2019; United Nations, 2018

#### Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita

PPP constant 2015 international $ in 2019

Mexico 21,041 22,190 G20 average

World Bank, 2021; United Nations, 2019

#### Death rate attributable to air pollution

Ambient air pollution attributable death rate per 1,000 population per year, age standardised in 2019

Over 48,000 people die in Mexico every year as a result of outdoor air pollution due to stroke, heart disease, lung cancer and chronic respiratory diseases. Compared to total population, this is still one of the lower levels in the G20.

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2020

This source differs from the source used in last year’s profiles, and therefore the data are not comparable.

#### A JUST TRANSITION

Civil society and other stakeholders promote discussion of a fair and inclusive energy transition to tackle inequalities and stop and reverse the federal administration’s energy and climate policies. If it continues to prioritise fossil fuels over renewables, Mexico will not meet its climate commitments. It is urgent to set the right conditions to promote a comprehensive and socially inclusive energy transition, which is attentive to and addresses the justice dimensions of a chosen transition pathway, especially regarding workers and communities in poverty or disadvantage. The justice dimension includes developing policies that i) address the costs and benefits of the energy transition and its fair distribution among different sectors and actors, ii) identify the previous forms of misrecognition and the multiple ways in which the existing energy system has created past injustices; and iii) identify the instruments and spaces for participation and the right to make decisions about the type of energy to be exploited, by whom, where and how.

Baker, 2020; World Resources Institute, 2020; CER, 2020
ADAPTATION NEEDS

Climate Risk Index
Impacts of extreme weather events in terms of fatalities and economic losses that occurred. All numbers are averages (1999-2018).

Annual weather-related fatalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Very low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER 100,000 INHABITANTS</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANKING:</td>
<td>12th in the G20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual average losses (US$ millions PPP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Very low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER UNIT GDP (%)</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANKING:</td>
<td>5th in the G20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Germanwatch, 2019

Exposure to future impacts at 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C

Impact ranking scale:

Very low | Low | Medium | High | Very high

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WATER</th>
<th>% of area with increase in water scarcity</th>
<th>1.5°C</th>
<th>2°C</th>
<th>3°C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of time in drought conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAT AND HEALTH</td>
<td>Heatwave frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Days above 35°C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>Reduction in crop duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5°C</td>
<td>2°C</td>
<td>3°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Water, Heat and Health: own research; Agriculture: Arnell et al., 2019

Note: These indicators are national scale results, weighted by area and based on global data sets. They are designed to allow comparison between regions and countries and, therefore, entail simplifications. They do not reflect local impacts within the country. Please see technical note for further information.

CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

Although COVID-19 has been discussed in Congress, no regulatory or institutional changes have been put in place to address its effects at the federal level nor has a climate justice approach been adopted. At the sub-national level, COVID-19 responses vary in their scope, resources available, budget and coordination with state and federal authorities. The existing social policies and programmes were in place before the pandemic and were shielded from spending cuts.

Veldzique Leyec, 2021
### Adaptation Readiness

The figure shows 2000-2018 observed data from the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index overlaid with projected Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) from 2020 to 2060.

Mexico scored well below the G20 average in 2018 in terms of adaptation readiness. It has both a great need for investment and innovations to improve readiness, and an urgent need for implementation of adaptation measures. Even if it puts in place social, economic and governance measures compatible with projected SSP1, Mexico will only just exceed the G20’s 2018 average score in 2040. Other measures, as represented by SSP2 and SSP3, will perpetuate its ranking below the G20 average in 2018, until 2050 and 2060 respectively.

The readiness component of the Index created by the ND-GAIN encompasses social (social inequality, information and communications technology infrastructure, education and innovation), economic, and governance indicators to assess a country’s readiness to deploy private and public investments in aid of adaptation. The index ranges from 0 (low readiness) to 1 (high readiness).

The overlaid SSPs are qualitative and quantitative representations of a range of projections of future governance and, therefore, of possible adaptation readiness. The three scenarios shown here in dotted lines are described as a sustainable development-compatible scenario (SSP1), a middle-of-the-road (SSP2), and a ‘Regional Rivalry’ (SSP3) scenario.

Based on Andrijevic et al., 2020; ND-Gain Index, 2021

### ADAPTATION POLICIES

#### National Adaptation Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document name</th>
<th>Publication year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Biodiversity</th>
<th>Coastal areas and fishing</th>
<th>Education and research</th>
<th>Energy and industry</th>
<th>Finance and insurance</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Tourism</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Urbanism</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Monitoring &amp; evaluation process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico’s National Strategy on Climate Change (ENCC)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ● ●</td>
<td>The Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources with the participation of the Inter-Secretariat Commission on Climate Change will review every six years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico’s National Strategy on Climate Change (ENCC)</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approved by the Intergovernmental Climate Commission but second approval is needed by the Regulatory Body of Federal Government and Treasury. Its content has not been shared with civil society yet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Programme for Climate Change (PECC)</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Adaptation

#### TARGETS
Reach net zero deforestation rate by 2030
Implement actions in 50% of municipalities identified as vulnerable according to the Special Climate Change Programme 2020-2024
Ensure the quantity and quality of water in human settlements with more than 500,000 inhabitants

#### ACTIONS
Prevention and management of negative impacts on the human population and the territory
Resilient production systems and food safety
Conservation, restoration and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services
Comprehensive water resources management with a focus on climate change
Protection of strategic infrastructure and tangible cultural heritage
Mexico’s GHG emissions excluding LULUCF have increased by 60% (1990-2018) and the government’s climate targets for 2030 (22% below BAU scenario) and 2050 (50% below 2000 levels) are not in line with a 1.5°C pathway.

In 2030, global CO₂ emissions need to be 45% below 2010 levels and reach net zero by 2050. Global energy-related CO₂ emissions must be cut by 40% below 2010 levels by 2030 and reach net zero by 2060.

Rogelj et al., 2018

Mexico’s emissions (excl. land use) increased by 60% between 1990 and 2018 to 724 MtCO₂e. When considered by category, increases were largely due to a sustained increase in energy-related emissions in all sectors, with particularly large increases in emissions from the power, transport and industry sectors. Mexico’s 2030 target, which contains the same pledge as its previous NDC, falls far short of its “fair-share” contribution. Mexico should strengthen its target to be in line with its “fair-share” contribution to the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

Gütschow et al., 2021; Climate Action Tracker, 2020a, 2021

Mexico uses IPCC methodologies in its National Communications which results in some discrepancies with calculations produced by the PRIMAP methodology used in this graph.

**Energy-related CO₂ emissions by sector**

Annual CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion (MtCO₂/year)
Fossil fuels still account for 87% of Mexico’s total primary energy supply, with oil the most dominant energy source (42%) followed by natural gas (39%). Renewables only make up 8% of the energy supply, mostly from large hydroelectric plants, wind and solar power.

The share of fossil fuels globally needs to fall to 67% of global total primary energy by 2030 and to 33% by 2050, and to substantially lower levels without carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Rogelj et al., 2018

This graph shows the fuel mix for all energy supply, including energy used not only for electricity generation, heating, and cooking, but also for transport fuels. Fossil fuels (oil, coal, and gas) make up 87% of Mexico’s energy mix, which is still higher than the G20 average of 81%. The share of renewable energy in the Mexican energy supply has remained relatively constant, with renewables accounting for 8% of Mexico’s total energy supply.

Enerdata, 2021

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.
Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

Solar, wind, geothermal and biomass account for 5.8% of Mexico’s energy supply – the G20 average is 7%. The share in total energy supply has increased by around 61% in the last five years in Mexico (2015-2020). Biomass (for electricity and heat) makes up the largest share.

Enerdata, 2021

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.
Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

Note: Large hydropower and solid fuel biomass in residential use are not reflected due to their negative environmental and social impacts.
Carbon intensity is a measure of how much CO\(_2\) is emitted per unit of energy supply. The emissions intensity of Mexico’s energy sector is 58 t\(\text{CO}_2\)/TJ and has trended upward by 1% since 2015, in contrast to the G20 average decline of 4% up to 2020. In 2020, the energy sector’s emissions intensity was slightly above the G20 average of 57 t\(\text{CO}_2\)/TJ, and this reflects a high share of increasing fossil fuels (gas) in the energy mix.

Enerdata, 2021; Secretaría de Energía, 2020

Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

Decarbonisation rating: carbon intensity of the energy sector compared to other G20 countries

| Current year (2020): | Medium |
| 5-year trend (2015-2020): | Low |

Energy supply per capita

TPES per capita (GJ/capita) in 2020

49.1
Mexico

92.6
G20 average

92.6
G20 average

-19.8%
Mexico

-0.12%
G20 average

Decarbonisation rating: energy supply per capita compared to other G20 countries

| Current year (2020): | Very high |
| 5-year trend (2015-2020): | Very high |

The level of energy use per capita is closely related to economic development, climatic conditions and the price of energy. Energy use per capita in Mexico was, at 49 GJ/capita in 2020, well below the G20 average, and decreased 19.77% between 2015 and 2020, which is far more rapidly than the G20 average decrease of 0.12% in the same period.

Enerdata, 2021; United Nations, 2019

Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

Energy intensity of the economy

(TJ/million US$2015 GDP) in 2019

2.7
Mexico

4.4
G20 average

-15.33%
Mexico

-10.56%
G20 average

Decarbonisation rating: energy intensity compared to other G20 countries

| Current year (2019): | Very high |
| 5-year trend (2014-2019): | High |

This indicator quantifies how much energy is used for each unit of GDP. This is closely related to the level of industrialisation, efficiency achievements, climatic conditions or geography. Mexico’s energy intensity is lower than the G20 average and has been decreasing at a slightly higher rate of 15% (2014-2019) than the G20 average rate of decrease of just under 11%.

Enerdata, 2021; World Bank, 2021
**POWER SECTOR**

**Emissions from energy used to make electricity and heat**

Mexico’s power sector is still heavily dependent on fossil fuels, primarily on natural gas. While the power sector produced 5% of electricity from coal and 10% from oil in 2020, 60% of its power was produced by natural gas and only 21% by renewables. This trend is likely continue under the government’s strategy to promote “clean” energy, which includes natural gas as part of “efficient” co-generation.

![Share of energy-related CO₂ emissions from electricity and heat production in 2020.](image)

**Electricity generation mix**

**Gross power generation (TWh)**

Mexico generated **76% of its electricity from fossil fuels in 2020**. The share of renewable energy, including large hydro, in Mexico’s power sector has been increasing steadily, accounting for approximately 21% of the power mix in 2020. However, natural gas still plays the largest role in the power supply, and the Mexican government has announced plans to continue natural gas exploration.

*Enerdata, 2021*

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.

Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

**Share of renewables in power generation**

(incl. large hydro) in 2020

Mexico generated **20.7%** of its electricity from renewable sources in 2020, compared to the **28.7%** G20 average. The share of renewables over the 5-year period (2015-2020) increased by **30.66%** in Mexico and **24.49%** in the G20 average.

*Enerdata, 2021*

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.

Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

**1.5°C COMPATIBILITY**

**1.5°C**

**CO₂**

28%

Worldwide, coal use for power generation needs to peak by 2020, and between 2030 and 2040, all the regions of the world need to phase out coal-fired power generation. By 2040, the share of renewable energy in electricity generation has to be increased to at least 75%, and the share of unabated coal reduced to zero.

*Rogelj et al., 2018; Climate Action Tracker, 2020b*

**Share of renewables in power generation**

Decarbonisation rating: share of renewables compared to other G20 countries

- **Current year** (2020): Low
- **5-year trend** (2015-2020): Medium
Emissions intensity of the power sector

For each kilowatt hour of electricity, 431 g of CO₂ are emitted in Mexico. The emissions intensity has only dropped marginally because the use of fossil fuels for power generation has barely dropped, still accounting for 75% of the power mix.

Enerdata, 2021

Some methodological discrepancies arose when trying to match Mexico’s official data with Enerdata, which is based on IEA.

### POLICY ASSESSMENT

#### Renewable energy in the power sector

While Mexico has some power sector policies that encourage the development of renewable power production, they are not being strongly enforced. Mexico has set targets for “clean” energy shares in its power sector of 35% by 2024, 40% by 2033 and 50% by 2050. However, while renewable technologies such as solar and wind are included under the category of “clean” energy, so are fossil-CCS technologies, nuclear and efficient co-generation with fossil fuels, such as natural gas. The country has already admitted that it will not meet its 2024 clean energy target in the power sector.

Solar and wind are increasingly cheaper than any new fossil fuel-based electricity capacity, but no significant renewable power capacity was added in 2020. Additional renewable energy capacity is also not planned to be included until 2027, according to Mexican power utility Business Plan.

Gobierno de la República de México, 2013; Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión de México, 2015; Secretaría de Energía, 2020; IRENA, 2020; CFE, 2021

#### Coal phase-out in the power sector

So far, the Mexican government has not implemented any policy or path to reduce or phase out coal in the country’s power sector. In 2020, in its effort to boost the local economy and increase coal extraction levels in the coal region, the Mexican government announced plans to purchase an additional two million tonnes of coal from small and medium mining companies. During the same year, the president announced plans to build a new coal-fired power plant. These measures have been “justified” under the banner of improving Mexico’s energy sovereignty and grid stability.

CFE, 2020

### CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

The federal government used COVID-19 and other disruptions to roll back renewable energy policies. While most of the wind and solar power projects operating in Mexico are owned by private companies, the administration continues promoting and subsidising fossil fuels for electricity generation (coal, fuel oil and gas) because these are the technologies of the power plants it owns. To support this approach, the federal government has issued – through the Secretariat of Energy (SENER), Energy Regulatory Commission and the National Energy Control Centre (CENACE) – 10 different executive orders aimed at derailing renewables while supporting its fossil fuel plants.

CENACE, 2019; CFE, 2020
Emissions from energy used to transport goods and people

Emissions from transport are still on the rise. 93% of passenger transport is by road, and 75% of freight transport travelled by road in 2021. Both sectors are still dominated by fossil fuels, and electric vehicles (EVs) make up only 0.26% of car sales. So far, the Mexican government has not set strong incentives for electrification of the transport sector nor to displace fossil fuels.

Electricity and natural gas together make up only 0.2% of the energy mix in transport.

Electricity and natural gas together make up only 0.2% of the energy mix in transport.

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.


Enerdata, 2021
United Nations, 2019

Rogelj et al., 2018; Climate Action Tracker, 2020b
### Aviation emissions per capita

(tCO₂/capita) in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Emissions (tCO₂/capita)</th>
<th>G20 average (tCO₂/capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decarbonisation rating: aviation emissions compared to other G20 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>G20 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>+34.68%</td>
<td>+21.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Motorisation rate

259 VEHICLES per 1,000 inhabitants in 2019 in the Mexico*

Enerdata, 2021

### Passenger transport

(modal split in % of passenger-km) in 2019*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterways</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agencia Reguladora del Transporte Ferroviario, 2019

### Freight transport

(modal split in million tonnes-km) in 2019*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterways</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SCT, 2019

*Owing to the variety of sources and data years available, these data are not comparable across G20 countries.

### Phase out fossil fuel cars

Medium

Mexico has set emissions performance standards for cars and has some tax incentives in place to encourage consumer purchase of EVs. However, in its recent strategy for promoting cleaner fuels and technologies, Mexico’s Energy Secretariat indicates that petroleum will continue as the transport sector’s dominant fuel source through 2050, with no plans to phase out fossil fuel vehicles. The Mexican government has not set any national targets for a share of EVs in new vehicle sales. Despite increasing urbanisation and population growth, the Mexican government projects that transport energy use will decrease through 2050, with few policies indicating how it will achieve this.

URBANET, 2019; Grados, Martínez and Villarreal, 2020; New Climate Institute, 2020; Secretaría de Energía, 2020

### Phase out fossil fuel heavy-duty vehicles

Medium

Mexico maintains vehicle emissions standards for heavy-duty and diesel vehicles on all new sales of vehicles starting from 2021. These standards are the first soot-free standard to be enacted in Latin America and are equivalent to those of North America and the European Union. This will contribute to Mexico’s pledge in its updated NDC to reduce black carbon emissions by 51% by 2030. However, it does not indicate any long-term strategy to reduce absolute emissions from freight transport.

Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT), 2017; Bloomberg, 2018

### Modal shift in (ground) transport

Medium

Mexico has only one policy to encourage a switch from fossil fuel private vehicles to EVs. However, it has enacted policies focused on encouraging other forms of modal shift in ground transport, such as non-motorised transport. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretariat for Territorial and Urban Development (SEDATU) unveiled the Safe, Healthy, Sustainable and Supportive Mobility Strategy (M4S), incorporating emergency cycleways, expanding sidewalks and safer public transport use under pandemic conditions. The Sustainable Urban Mobility Strategy (EMUS) suffered budget cuts and, in its 2019 Strategy for the Promotion of Cleaner Fuels and Technologies, the Energy Secretariat does not project increases in public transport such as rail lines or buses, but rather an increase in air transport at the expense of road transport.

IEA, 2017; New Climate Institute, 2020; Secretaría de Energía, 2020
**BUILDING SECTOR**

Emissions from energy used to build, heat and cool buildings

Direct emissions and indirect emissions from the building sector in Mexico account for 5% and 11% of total energy-related CO₂ emissions, respectively. Per capita emissions from the building sector are less than half of the G20 average.

Share of buildings in energy-related CO₂ emissions. Building emissions occur directly (burning fuels for heating, cooking, etc) and indirectly (grid-electricity for air conditioning, appliances, etc.)

By 2040, global emissions from buildings need to be reduced by 90% from 2015 levels, and be 95-100% below 2015 levels by 2050, mostly through increased efficiency, reduced energy demand, and electrification in conjunction with complete decarbonisation of the power sector.

**COMPATIBILITY**

**1.5°C**

Building emissions per capita (incl. indirect emissions) (tCO₂/capita) in 2020

Building emissions: 5-year trend (2015-2020)

- Mexico: -11.92%
- G20 average: -2.91%

Decarbonisation rating: building emissions compared to other G20 countries

Current year (2020):
- Mexico: Very high
- G20 average: High

5-year trend (2015-2020):
- Mexico: Very high
- G20 average: High

Building-related emissions per capita are less than half of the G20 average as of 2020. This is likely the result of high coverage of energy efficiency policies, with 44% of energy use in the building sector covered by mandatory energy efficiency policies. Mexico has managed to decrease emissions intensity in the building sector by 12% (2015-2020), much faster than the G20 average.

**POLICY ASSESSMENT**

**Near zero energy new buildings**

As of 2018, 44% of energy use in the building sector was covered by energy efficiency policies. Mexico has enacted mandatory energy efficiency standards for buildings, however, it has no national strategy for promoting near zero energy new buildings. Furthermore, the Roadmap for the Energy Efficiency Code and Standards for Buildings in Mexico is not being monitored as the technical follow-up committee for the Roadmap has not convened during the current federal administration (i.e., since 2017). Some states, such as Yucatan state, have enacted their own net zero energy building policies. Existing codes cover improved thermal insulation, energy conservation and windows in both residential and commercial buildings. Notably lacking is a support scheme for heating and cooling in buildings, an important and necessary policy option as Mexico is projected to see increased temperatures across much of its territory due to climate change.

**Renovation of existing buildings**

Mexico’s Building Energy Conservation Code applies to both new and existing residential and commercial buildings. However, it does not have a national agenda for retrofitting all existing buildings stock to energy efficiency standards nor for incorporating renewable energy into existing buildings.

**MEXICO**

MITIGATION

MITIGATION | CLIMATE TRANSPARENCY REPORT | 2021 | MEXICO | CLIMATE TRANSPARENCY REPORT | 2021 | MEXICO
Industry emissions intensity\(^7\)

\((\text{tCO}_2/\text{USD2015 GVA})\) in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>G20 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry emissions intensity: 5-year trend (2012-2017)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decarbonisation rating: industry emissions intensity compared to other G20 countries</td>
<td>+0.02%</td>
<td>-16.45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20 average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\)Enerdata, 2021; World Bank, 2021

Carbon intensity of steel production\(^8\)

\((\text{kgCO}_2/\text{tonne product})\) in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>World average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steel production and steelmaking are significant GHG emissions sources, and challenging to decarbonise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Steel Association, 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No data available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World average</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POLICY ASSESSMENT**

**Energy efficiency**

As of 2018, only 16% of Mexico’s industrial energy use was covered by energy efficiency policies. Overall, energy efficiency improvements have avoided only 5% of additional energy use in Mexico in the period 2010-2018. This is largely due to a switch in the industrial sector from mainly energy-intensive industry sectors to less-intensive manufacturing and service sectors. Mexico’s Energy Secretariat projects that energy use in industry will continue to rise through 2050, with its main energy source continuing to be natural gas.

\(^8\)World Steel Association, 2018; Secretaría de Energía, 2020; IEA, 2021
The land use and forestry sector has consistently been a net sink of emissions in Mexico. Although the rate of deforestation began to decrease after 2015, Mexico still experiences net forest loss annually. To stay within the 1.5°C limit, Mexico needs to ensure that the land use and forestry sector remains a net sink of emissions by conserving remaining forests and stopping the conversion of forests into croplands and cattle pastures – the main cause of deforestation in Mexico.

Global deforestation needs to be halted and changed to net CO\textsubscript{2} removals by around 2030. Rogelj et al., 2018

Mexico’s agricultural emissions are mainly from livestock enteric fermentation (mainly cattle) and livestock manure. A 1.5°C compatible pathway requires manure management and livestock diet improvement, as well as behavioural and dietary shifts, and economic incentives.

Methane emissions (mainly enteric fermentation) need to decline by 10% by 2030 and by 35% by 2050 (from 2010 levels). Nitrous oxide emissions (mainly from fertilisers and manure) need to be reduced by 10% by 2030 and by 20% by 2050 (from 2010 levels). Rogelj et al., 2018

In Mexico, the largest sources of GHG emissions in the agriculture sector are livestock enteric fermentation (54%) and manure (32%). Livestock diet improvement, halting agricultural frontier, efficient use of fertilisers, dietary changes as well as reductions in food waste could help reduce emissions from this sector.

FAO, 2021

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%
The combined mitigation effect of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) assessed by April 2021 is not sufficient and will lead to a warming of 2.4°C by the end of the century. This highlights the urgent need for all countries to submit more ambitious targets by COP26, as they agreed to do in 2015, and to urgently strengthen their climate action to align to the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal.

Climate Analytics, 2021a

### Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Mitigation

Mexico’s updated NDC, submitted in December 2020, maintained its previous emissions reduction commitment of 22% below its BAU scenario by 2030. However, it also upwardly revised the 2030 projected emissions in its BAU, resulting in an effectively weaker target than its previous NDC. The revised BAU reports slightly lower numbers in 2030 for the transport, power, and oil and gas sectors while projecting higher 2030 emissions for the agriculture, industry, and waste sectors.

#### TARGETS

| Unconditional: Reduce emissions 22% below BAU by 2030, including LULUCF (19% above 2010 levels by 2030, excluding LULUCF) |
| CONDITIONAL: Reduce emissions 36% below BAU by 2030, dependent on international financial support (2% below 2010 levels by 2030, excluding LULUCF) |

#### ACTIONS

Not mentioned

### Climate Action Tracker (CAT) evaluation of targets and actions

This CAT evaluation is a new, overall rating, that combines the several, separately rated elements, of policies and actions, domestic and internationally supported targets, ‘fair-share target’ and the country’s contribution to climate finance. The “Highly insufficient” rating indicates that Mexico’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with any interpretation of a ‘fair-share’ contribution and lead to rising, rather than falling, emissions, with an exception being Mexico’s conditional NDC target, which roughly stabilises emissions at today’s level.

The CAT rates the internationally supported target as “Insufficient” as it is not in line with modelled domestic pathways, and the unconditional target as “Critically insufficient”, meaning that this target is falling far behind the country’s ‘fair-share’ contribution. Furthermore, Mexico’s plans to not increase its 2030 mitigation ambition are contrary to the Paris Agreement’s requirement that each successive NDC should represent a progression on their mitigation efforts. For the full assessment of the country’s target and actions, and the explication of the methodology see www.climateactiontracker.org

Climate Action Tracker, 2021

This assessment includes our policy analysis from 22 September 2020 translated into our new rating methodology without new analysis of Mexico’s climate policies since then, except the NDC update submitted in December 2020.

### NDC Transparency Check recommendations

Mexico’s NDC was submitted to the UNFCCC in November 2016 and updated on 29 December 2020. A comparison of the 2016 and 2020 NDCs reveals some additional information has been provided in the form of:

- More detailed information on the adaptation component, recognising and prioritising communities vulnerable to climate change.
- A planning process to develop the NDC was held between different levels of government, civil society, and young people and included gender responsiveness measures.

There is still room to improve comparability, transparency, and understanding in Mexico’s future NDCs by:

- Providing the assumptions and methodological approaches for accounting for BAU projections and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions and removals.
- Including emissions reduction assessments to ensure each of Mexico’s NDCs is more stringent than its previous target, and aligns with the Paris Agreement’s long-term objectives.
- Detailing the implementation plans to account for its target(s).

For more visit www.climate-transparency.org/ndc-transparency-check

### AMBITION: LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

The Paris Agreement invites countries to communicate mid-century, long-term, and low-GHG emissions development strategies by 2020. Long-term strategies are an essential component of the transition toward net zero emissions and climate-resilient economies.

| Status | Submitted to UNFCCC, last update in 2016 |
| Interim steps | 30% reduction by 2030 |
| Sectoral targets | Yes |
| Net zero target | No |
| Net zero year | 50% reduction below 2000 levels |

For more visit www.climate-transparency.org/ndc-transparency-check
Make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low-GHG emissions and climate-resilient development.

In 2019, Mexico spent USD 17bn on fossil fuel subsidies, with roughly 90% of those subsidies supporting fossil fuels. Oil alone received 73% of total subsidy spending. A carbon tax was introduced in 2014 for fossil fuels excluding natural gas. Therefore, tax is only levied on the additional amount of emissions that would be generated if oil were used instead of natural gas.

Investment in green energy and infrastructure needs to outweigh fossil fuel investments by 2025.

Rogelj et al., 2018

Fiscal policy levers raise public revenues and direct public resources. Critically, they can shift investment decisions and consumer behaviour towards low-carbon, climate-resilient activities by reflecting externalities in the price.

Fossil fuel subsidies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Petroleum</th>
<th>Natural gas</th>
<th>End-use electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the past decade (2010-2019), Mexico’s fossil fuel subsidies have oscillated considerably, reaching a value of USD 17.1bn in 2019. Over this period, most of the subsidies were directed to support the production and consumption of petroleum. Comparable data is not available yet for 2020. However, according to the Energy Policy Tracker data, during 2020 Mexico pledged at least USD 3bn to fossil fuel energy as part of its energy-related funding commitments and COVID-19 economic response. The government support has been pledged in the form of a fiscal stimulus targeted at the state-owned enterprise Pemex; the stimulus aimed at reducing the tax on oil extraction to foster Pemex’ investments.

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.

CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

Under economic pressure from the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexico dismantled its national Fund for Climate Change in 2020, originally created in 2012 through its General Law on Climate Change. So far, the government has plans to direct only 1.1% of the total budget of the country towards activities to fight climate change for 2021. Of this small amount of public spending, 75% is designated to fund transport measures using natural gas, which will only undermine Mexico’s emission mitigation efforts.

Greenpeace México, 2020; Almeida Lopez, 2020
Governments steer investments through their public finance institutions, including via development banks both at home and overseas, and green investment banks. Developed G20 countries also have an obligation to provide finance to developing countries, and public sources are a key aspect of these obligations under the UNFCCC.

Public finance for fossil fuels

USD per annum (2018-19 average)

Between 2018 and 2019, Mexico provided an average of USD 578m per year in public finance for the oil and gas sector, mainly through Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos (Banobras) and Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (Bancomex). No evidence was found for public finance for coal. The most notable project financed was the Los Ramones Norte Gas Pipeline, located in Mexico, which received USD 223m each from Banobras, Bancomex and Nacional Financiera (Nafin).

Oil Change International, 2020

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.

Provision of international public support

Mexico is not listed in Annex II of the UNFCCC and is, therefore, not formally obliged to provide climate finance. It has, nevertheless, continued to provide international public finance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund and, in 2015, supported the first resource mobilisation of the Green Climate Fund (USD 10m). While Mexico may channel international public finance towards climate change via multilateral and other development banks, it has not been included in this report.

Oil Change International, 2020

Due to rounding, some graphs may sum to slightly above or below 100%.
Financial policy and regulation

Through policy and regulation, governments can overcome challenges to mobilising green finance, including real and perceived risks, insufficient returns on investment, capacity and information gaps.

In April 2020, the Financial System Stability Council (convened by the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) and the Central Bank of Mexico (Banco de México)) launched the Sustainable Finance Committee that will oversee improving the availability of data through sustainable investment guides, indicators, recommendations and processes for the analysis and the management of climate and environmental risks.

In June 2021, Banco de México initiated the dialogue and presented the framework of Mexico’s finance solution Greening the Finance Sector. It also highlighted the role of the Sustainable Finance Committee to structure the dialogue around mainstreaming the climate and environmental risks in financial strategies, establishing clear rules for companies and intermediaries, defining a national taxonomy on sustainable investments, and establishing an agenda to capitalise on the opportunities to transition towards a sustainable economy.

Banco de México also launched a report on Climate and Environmental Risks and Opportunities in Mexico’s Financial System: From Diagnosis to Action in May 2020. It called upon Mexican financial institutions to incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into risk assessment, increase green finance flows to the economy, and define a national taxonomy for green and sustainable activities. In June 2020, the Mexican stock exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, BMV) along with S&P launched the Total Mexico ESG Index, which will set a new benchmark for sustainability and investment.

---

**Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Finance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment needs</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International market mechanisms</td>
<td>No contribution from international credits for the achievement of the target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The '1.5°C compatible pathway' is derived from global, cost-effective pathways assessed by the IPCC's SR15, selected based on sustainability criteria, and defined by the 5th-50th percentiles of the distributions of such pathways subject to the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. Negative emissions from the land sector, and novel negative emissions technologies not included in the assessed mitigation pathways, contribute to one primary negative emission technology (BECCS). In addition to domestic 1.5°C compatible emissions pathways, the 'fair-share' emissions reduction range would almost always require a developed country to provide enough support through climate finance, or other means of implementation, to bring the total emissions reduction contribution of that country down to the required 'fair-share' level.

2. 'Land use' emissions is used here to refer to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) derives historical LULUCF emissions from the UNFCCC Common Reporting Format (CRF) reporting tables data converted to the categories from the IPCC 1996 guidelines, in particular separating Agriculture from LULUCF, which under the new IPCC 2006 Guidelines is integrated into Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU).

3. The Decarbonisation Ratings assess the current year and average of the most recent five years (where available) to take account of the different starting points of different G20 countries.

4. The selection of policies rated and the assessment of 1.5°C compatibility are primarily informed by the Paris Agreement and the IPCC's 2018 SR15. The table below displays the criteria used to assess a country's policy performance.

5. The 1.5°C 'fair-share' ranges for 2030 are drawn from the CAT, which compiles a wide range of perspectives on what is considered fair, including considerations such as responsibility, capability, and equality. Countries with 1.5°C 'fair-share' ranges reaching below zero, are expected to achieve such strong reductions by domestic emissions reductions, supplemented by contributions to global emissions reduction efforts via, for example, international finance. On a global scale, negative emissions technologies are expected to play a role from the 2030s onwards, compensating for remaining positive emissions. In order to maintain comparability across all countries, this report harmonises all data with PRIMAP, 2021 dataset to 2018. However, note that Common Reporting Format (CRF) data is available for countries which have recently updated GHG inventories. Where countries submitted updated NDC targets before August 2021, these have been analysed and included.

6. This indicator adds up emissions from domestic aviation and international aviation bunkers in the respective country. In this Country Profile, however, only a radiative forcing factor of 1 is assumed.

7. This indicator includes only direct energy-related emissions and process emissions (Scope 1) but not indirect emissions from electricity.

8. This indicator includes emissions from electricity (Scope 2) as well as direct energy-related emissions and process emissions (Scope 1).

On endnote 4.

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY


data provided in July 2021. For more detail on

Arnell, N. W. et al. (2019). “Global and Regional Impacts of

Andrijevic, M. et al. (2020). “Governance in Socioeconomic


Mexico's

Fighting for a Just Transition


Dialogue with Central Bank about Greening the Finance

Sector. https://www.biefin.org/


CENACE. (2019). CENACE informa la cancelación de la SLP-


---(2020). Proyecto Comunidades y Energías Renovables

https://proyectocar.org/
Estimación De La Tasa De Deforestación
Gobierno de la República de México. (2013).
Mexico’s Climate Change
Global Climate Risk Index 2020. Who
Nationally Determined Contributions 2020
México sin Ambición Para
The PRIMAP-hist National
Global Carbon
www.greenpeace.org/
https://www.energiaestrategica.com/
emissions-database.html
www.enerdata.net/research/energy-market-data-co2-
conafor.gob.mx
Método De Muestreo: Documento Técnico.
Bruta En México Para El Periodo 2001-2018 Mediante El
www.semarnat.gob.mx.
Expansion, Deforestation and Net Change Indicator.
www.fao.org/faostat
energypolicytracker.org/
https://www.ipcc.ch/
Mid-Century Strategy.
http://www.energypolicytracker.org/
https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/
ND-GAIN Country Index.
https://www.i4ce.org/
Accounts 2021
https://www.sct.gob.mx/transporte-y-medicina-
https://www.spglobal.com/
https://www.dof.gob.mx/
Limpios. Mexico.
cieloslinks.org/
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-71809-4
theresilience.org